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SELF-REGULATION OF THE AMERICAN RETAIL
SECURITIES MARKETS –
AN OXYMORON FOR WHAT IS BEST FOR
INVESTORS?
Steven Irwin, Scott Lane, Carolyn Mendelson, and Tara
Tighe∗
For self-regulation to be effective, government must play a residual
role, keeping a shotgun “behind the door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned and
ready for use but with the hope that it would never have to be used.”1
- William O. Douglas, SEC Chairman

INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1930, a mechanic from Houston wrote that in “[a] land
flowing with milk and honey,”
a “first-class mechanic can’t make an honest living.” Having lost
his savings in the recent stock market crash and unable to find
work in the shadow of the Great Depression, he was too proud to
beg for money and “too honest to steal.” In the end, he decided
to take matters into his own hands, writing that he would “rather
take [his] chances with a just God than with an unjust
humanity.”2
Eighty-one years later, the story is still much the same, and the need
for investor protection for the American retail investing public is greater

∗ Steven Irwin is a Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission and a partner
at Leech Tishman Fuscaldo & Lampl. Scott Lane is the Deputy Chief Counsel for the
Pennsylvania Securities Commission. Carolyn Mendelson is Counsel for the Pennsylvania
Securities Commission. Tara Tighe is a 2012 J.D. candidate at the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law.
1. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (Allen ed., 1940).
2. ANTHONY J. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION YEARS, 1933–1940 11
(2002).
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than ever. On December 11, 2008, Richard Shapiro, a retired real estate
developer, rose one morning expecting to quietly peruse the morning
newspaper. Instead, his worst fears were starkly splashed across the front
page. He felt the color drain from his face as he struggled to comprehend
the dire headlines. Bernard Madoff, a trusted financial adviser, had been
arrested after confessing to cheating investors out of billions of dollars.3
Mr. Shapiro reeled at the news. Upon retirement, he had invested the
entirety of his savings with Madoff. In an instant, his financial security had
vanished. Shapiro sunk into a deep depression and did not leave his home
for twenty-three days. Too upset to eat, he lost thirty pounds. To make
ends meet, he was forced to sell his home and abandon retirement. Despite
these sacrifices, he still struggles to ensure his bills are paid. Shapiro has
stated that he felt “violated” because regulators had acted like “coconspirators” instead of protecting investors.4
When the federal government first ventured into securities regulation
in the 1930s, it was in direct response to a cataclysmic event: the stock
market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. Although
speculation was rampant leading up to the crash, the types of investments at
the time were mostly limited to stocks and bonds. Eight decades later, the
regulatory structure of the retail securities markets is relatively the same,
yet the complexity of that market has grown exponentially. Investors may
now purchase variable annuities, exchange-traded funds, options, foreign
currency, and a seemingly unlimited number of exotic securities created by
investment banks. Many of these complex investments, in particular credit
default swaps and debt obligations collateralized by subprime mortgages,
were instrumental in the global recession that began in 2008.
At the same time, some very public failures in the enforcement of
American securities laws (in particular, the Madoff and Allen Stanford
investment scandals) further eroded investor confidence in the securities
markets and in the ability of regulators to regulate those markets. The
Office of Inspector General’s Investigative Report concerning Madoff is
particularly damning. It found that the United States Securities &
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) had enough information to warrant an
extensive investigation of Madoff as early as 1992.5 Despite these
warnings and incriminating evidence provided to regulators, neither the

3. Amir Efrati, Tom Lauricella, & Dionne Searcey, Top Broker Accused of $50
Billion Fraud, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 15, 2008, at A14.
4. Letter from Richard Shapiro, Madoff Victim, to the Honorable Denny Chin, U.S.
District Court, Southern District of New York (Mar. 10, 2009).
5. U.S. SEC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, REPORT NO. OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF
FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME (PUBLIC VERSION)
(2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf.
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SEC nor the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)—the selfregulatory organization (“SRO”) for broker-dealers and their agents—
responded to Madoff’s Ponzi scheme until after he confessed in 2008.6
The recent economic crisis has garnered the attention of the United
States Congress, the European Union, and regulators across the globe.
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) in 2010, touted as the most sweeping
change to financial regulation since the Great Depression. Included in the
Dodd-Frank Act is a requirement for the SEC to evaluate the adequacy of
its oversight of investment advisers and to recommend whether Congress
should designate one or more SROs to bolster the SEC’s supervision.7
FINRA, which is already the SRO for broker-dealers, has signaled its
desire to be the SRO for investment advisers as well.8 As of this writing,
hearings have been held before the House Financial Services Committee on
proposed legislation authorizing one or more SROs for investment
advisers.9
Missing from the debate in the United States, however, is whether the
SRO model of securities regulation is an appropriate part of the American
regulatory framework in the first place, and if so, whether any changes
need to be made in order to make the regulatory framework more efficient
and effective. This Article explores the complicated history of selfregulation in the U.S. retail securities markets, and analyzes the current
challenges in cooperation among the SEC, FINRA, and state securities
regulators. Finally, a variety of normative solutions are offered to highlight
opportunities to improve efficiency, reduce potential conflicts of interest,
enhance communication, and limit costs.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The allure of profits inevitably engenders speculation and aggressive

6. Id. at 1. As a result of the SEC investigation, however, the SEC disciplined eight
employees for missteps related to the Madoff investigation. See Jesse Hamilton, SEC
Suspended Employees, Cut Pay Over Madoff Missteps, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 14, 2011,
available
at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-11/sec-suspended-employeesreduced-pay-over-missteps-related-to-madoff-case.html.
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 914, 15 U.S.C. §
80b-11 (2012).
8. Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Fin. Indus. Regulatory
Auth., Speech at Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association Compliance and
Legal
Division’s
Annual
Seminar
(Mar.
22,
2011),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Speeches/Ketchum/P123371.
9. Hearing witnesses and written submissions can be found at the Committee on
Financial Services’ website at http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.
aspx?EventID=258252.
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trading practices. The 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing Depression
are generally credited with inspiring federal securities regulation.10 The
long history of retail securities regulation in the United States, however, is
far more nuanced.
A.

Brokers “Exchange” Independence For Structure And Credibility

Wall Street experienced its first major crash in 1792.11 In the wake of
that crash, Pennsylvania and New York passed legislation intended to
regulate the sales of securities.12 New York aggressively disallowed openair “public outcry” markets.13 In response, brokers took control of their
own destinies and began to associate together, planting the seeds of
exchange-based trading and self-regulation in America.14
In May of 1792, twenty-four brokers congregated at 68 Wall Street.15
They “pledged to deal primarily among themselves and to honor minimum
commission rates.”16 Members of that group of brokers officially formed
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE” or “the Exchange”) on March 8,
1817.17
10. A Brief History of Securities Regulation, STATE OF WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS.,
http://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/regexemp/history.htm (last visited June 2, 2012).
11. The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities
Industry, 1792–2010, SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.
org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02a.php (last visited June 2, 2012).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Early American self-regulated exchanges followed the British tradition of
private trading clubs of the times. See id. More recently, the United Kingdom’s regulatory
system for financial services had its roots in self-regulation within the Financial Services
Authority (“FSA”), as created in October 1997. PEIJIE WANG, FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 308
(2d ed. 2009). For over a decade, the FSA served as a single independent organization that
was responsible for overseeing the banking, brokerage, and insurance industries. However,
recent weakness in global financial services has brought about the downfall of the FSA and
self regulation. The FSA is set to be disbanded by 2012 in favor of government-controlled
regulators. Shannon Hawthorne, UK Chancellor announces abolition of FSA, HFMWEEK
(June 17, 2010), http://www.hfmweek.com/news/572177/uk-chancellor-announcesabolition-of-fsa.thtml.
16. Buttonwood
Agreement,
SEC
HISTORICAL
SOC’Y,
http://sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1790/1792_0517_NYSEButtonwood.pdf.
17. The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities
Industry, SEC HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/
sro02a.php (last visited June 2, 2012) [hereinafter SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY]. Juxtapose the
time period for the creation of the NYSE with the more recent development of a non-state
controlled securities market in China. The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange were each founded in 1990. Brief Introduction to the SEE, SSE.COM.CN,
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en_us/ps/about/bi.shtml (last visited June 2, 2012); SZSE
Major Event and Milestones from 1990–2011 (Condensed Version), SZSE.CN,
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The NYSE was premised on seventeen rules that governed trading and
provided for admission and discipline of members.18 The NYSE
envisioned a trading platform in which strenuous admission standards
would make sanctions and discipline unnecessary. The Exchange was
largely governed by the personal ethical standards of its members. In
Belton v. Hatch, the Court of Appeals of New York characterized the
NYSE as a “business club.”19 This permitted the Exchange to “regulate its
members as it saw fit” and provides an early example of a self-regulator
assuming control of the discipline of industry participants.20
B.

State Securities Regulation

As individual investors’ access to the securities markets increased,
states developed laws specifically regulating the offer and sale of securities
to protect investors from fraud. State regulation originated as an exercise
of state police power under the Tenth Amendment, with Kansas setting the
standard by passing the first blue sky law in 1911.21 The United States
Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of state securities laws in
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.22 In Hall, multiple provisions of various blue sky
laws were evaluated for their constitutionality. The blue sky law in Ohio
provided that all dealers must be licensed before they were permitted to
conduct business within the State. In holding the law Constitutional, the
Hall Court found that the law was merely a regulation of business with the
goal of protecting the public against the imposition of unsubstantial

http://www.szse.cn/main/en/AboutSZSE/Milestone/ (last visited June 2, 2012). China has
adopted recent national regulation to cultivate worldwide investor confidence, gain access to
the World Trade Organization, fund state owned entities (SOEs) with private investment
dollars, and develop the country into a “social market economy.” Upon the creation of the
two major Chinese stock exchanges, the State Council of China established the China
Securities Regulatory Commission which is similar to the SEC. The China Securities
Regulatory Commission: Dedicated to Protecting Investors’ Rights and Interests, CHINA
SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/ (last
visited June 2, 2012).
18. NYSE
Constitution
of
1817,
SEC
HISTORICAL
SOC’Y,
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1810/1817_0225_NYSEConstitutionT.pdf.
19. 17 N.E. 225, 226 (N.Y. 1888).
20. SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY, supra note 17.
21. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 347 (1991). The State of Kansas at the time had a large proportion of agriculturalists
not versed in ordinary business methods. By 1911, the state had become a hunting ground
for promoters of fraudulent enterprises. Laws aimed to stop schemes which have no more
bases than so many feet of blue sky became known as “blue sky” laws. Hall v. GeigerJones, 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
22. Hall, 242 U.S. at 559.
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schemes and the securities based upon them.23
To establish a uniform system of state securities regulation, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prepared
the Uniform Sale of Securities Act (“the Uniform Act”) in October 1929.
The majority of states have adopted blue sky regulations modeled after the
Uniform Act.24
By 1931, every state had adopted some form of securities laws.
Unlike the disclosure-based system of the later federal securities laws, all
of the early state securities laws were “merit” review laws, providing the
state regulator the authority to deny applications which were not fair, just,
or equitable to investors or which were not based on sound business
principles.25 To increase efficiency, among other purposes, state regulators
have worked cooperatively since 1919 through the North American
Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”).
C.

The Calm Before The Storm

After World War I, the retail investment industry experienced a period
of sustained high growth as individual investors discovered the stock
market in increasing numbers.26 Stock prices soared, but the average
investor was unaware that to a large extent those profits were a mirage,
built on false promises. During this time, there were numerous examples
of market manipulation and a failure of self-regulation. Stock pools were
used to buy stock, boost the price, and then unload it at a profit.27 Brokers
would create a “swirl of phony trading” that would cause stock prices to
skyrocket.28 One example of such manipulation is the Libby Owens
False
Security Trading Pool, managed by Joseph P. Kennedy.29
information, implying that Libby-Owens-Ford was on the rise, was leaked

23. Id. at 550.
24. The Uniform Act is a model law intended to provide each state with a guide to
draft its securities law. Subsequent versions of the Uniform Act have been passed in 1956,
1985, and 2002.
25. See generally JOSEPH LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 1:42 (discussing
the “merit regulation” aspects of early state securities laws).
26. Andrew Beattie, The Pioneers of Financial Fraud, INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 15, 2009),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/09/history-of
fraud.asp#axzz1SyTOs2Wa.
27. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 72nd Cong., pt. 6 at 2204 (1933).
28. Randall Smith & Linda Sandler, Raiders’ Activities Revive Memories of 1920s
Pools, WALL STREET J., Nov. 10, 1986.
29. TED SCHWARZ, JOSEPH P. KENNEDY: THE MOGUL, THE MOB, THE STATESMAN, AND
THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN MYTH 177 (2003).
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to “everyone who could influence the stock.”30 Kennedy is estimated to
have made more than $60,000 on the stock run-up in four months.31 Before
the ensuing crash, Kennedy liquidated his long-term holdings and
continued to make money on the declining market by selling short.32
The situation was exacerbated by the limited reach of state regulators,
whose jurisdiction was limited to protecting their own respective citizens.33
Generally, state regulators had little if any authority over national or even
regional exchanges.
D. The Crash
On Tuesday, October 29, 1929, Americans witnessed the “most
disastrous day in the stock market’s history.”34 Prices collapsed under
panic selling and the “pressure of liquidation of securities which had to be
sold at any price.”35 In a single day, 16,410,030 shares were traded on the
New York Stock Exchange.36 By mid-November, the market had lost
The
twenty-six billion dollars, or forty percent of its value.37
unemployment rate ballooned to nearly twenty-five percent. The existing
securities regulatory structure had failed. The financial system needed
drastic change, and in the 1932 election, the nation placed their faith in
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The public blamed the industry for the national
panic and what would be a long-term American economic depression.38
E.

The Depression Inspires Federal Regulation
When Franklin Delano Roosevelt won the presidency in 1933, the

30. Id.
31. Id. Contrast the 1920s in the United States to the 1990s and 2000s in China when
China faced extensive criticism for ineffective enforcement to catch insider trading. See
Karby Leggett, China Will Merge Its Two Stock Markets—Combined Bourse Will be in
Shanghai; Start-Ups Will Trade in Shenzhen, at A23, Wall Street J., Sept. 12, 2000.
32. SCHWARZ, supra note 29, at 177.
33. Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972 § 702, 70 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-702 (2011).
34. Closing Rally Vigorous, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1929.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. DAVID F. BURG, THE GREAT DEPRESSION 47 (Facts on File, Inc. 1996) (2005).
38. The massive social chaos, poverty and strife of the Great Depression are echoed
today in the current global recession. An overall lack of government regulation of the
largest and most powerful forces in today’s financial markets has been well documented as
one of the key culprits in today’s “Great Recession.” See Bruce Bartlett, The Great
Depression and The Great Recession, FORBES.COM, http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/29/
depression-recession-gdp-imf-milton-friedman-opinions-columnists-bruce-bartlett.html (last
visited June 2, 2012) (comparing the circumstances leading up to the Great Depression the
circumstances of the current economic crisis).
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U.S. financial services industry was a sinking ship, taking on more water
by the minute. The capsizing markets were a direct result of plummeting
investor confidence, a crucial ingredient in stable retail securities markets.
In his inaugural address, Roosevelt called for swift and unilateral
action. He openly condemned the practices of “unscrupulous money
changers.”39 He declared that the “rulers of the Exchange of mankind’s
goods have failed through their own stubbornness and their own
incompetence.”40
With the scars of the 1929 crash still fresh, Roosevelt challenged
Congress to create a system of strict supervision of all banking, credits and
investments.41 The implication was clear; Roosevelt recognized the
shortcomings of the current regulatory system, including the failure of selfregulation, and the need for the federal government to manage the U.S.
securities markets.
Congress responded quickly to Roosevelt’s warnings and the national
emergencies that ensued in the wake of failed self-regulation, and passed
the Securities Act of 1933 (“the 1933 Act”) in May of 1933. The 1933 Act
regulates disclosure requirements in new issuances42 to prevent fraud in the
initial offer and sale of securities.43
Regulating just the initial sale of securities was insufficient, however.
The secondary markets could not be left to national self-regulation. In a
February 1934 statement to Congress, Roosevelt called for national
regulation of the exchanges in order to eliminate widespread market
manipulation and abuse. He admonished that “naked speculation has been
made far too alluring and far too easy.”44
At the President’s request, Congress met to consider additional
legislation and Congressional committees heard testimony from various
industry professionals. These committees heard testimony on how the
industry had grown so quickly. For example, in 1910 there were 500
branches of stock exchange houses and by 1929 there were 1,600.45
Speculation grew as stock prices continued to climb. The Dow Jones

39. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres49.html.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. MARC STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 115 (5th ed. 2009).
43. Id.
44. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Congress (Feb. 6, 1934), available at
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1930/1934_02_06_FD
R_on_Stock_Exch.pdf.
45. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., pt. 15 at 6437 (1934).
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Industrial Average rose from 73 in 1921 to 313 in 1929.46 Brokers’ loans
increased from $1.5 billion in 1922 to $8.5 billion in 1929. More than ten
billion dollars of new stock was issued in 1929 alone. In the crash of
October 1929, brokers’ loans collapsed by three billion dollars in ten days,
and by eight billion dollars in the following three years. The Dow Jones
Industrial Average declined by an astounding eighty-nine percent between
September 1929 and July 1932.47
Based on these considerations, Congress passed the Securities and
Exchange Act in 1934 (“the 1934 Act”). The 1934 Act regulated the sale
of securities in the secondary market and created the SEC.48 Joseph
Kennedy, with his reputation for unscrupulous market manipulation, was
placed at the helm of the fledgling organization.49 Roosevelt is said to have
responded to criticism of the appointment by saying “it takes a thief to
catch a thief.”50 So, who better than Kennedy to lead the new experiment
in federal securities regulation?
The 1934 Act recognized that the trading of securities has national
implications; hence, it is necessary to provide for government regulation
and control of such transactions to protect the general welfare of the
country.51 Specifically, one portion of the 1934 Act sought to increase
margin requirements to make it more difficult for brokers and dealers to
borrow to trade.52 Before the 1934 Act, the exchanges made their own
rules regarding buying on margin. Margins as high as ninety percent of
trade amounts were not uncommon. Section 7 of the 1934 Act made it
clear that Congress was to “prescribe rules and regulations with respect to
the amount of credit that may be initially extended and subsequently
maintained on any security (other than an exempted security or a security
futures product).”53

46. Dow Jones Average Yearly Change, AUTOMATIONINFORMATION.COM,
http://www.automationinformation.com/DJIA/dow_jones_average_year
ly_change.htm (last visited June 2, 2012).
47. DJI Historical Prices | Down Jones Industrial Average Stock, YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EDJI&a=08&b=1&c=1929&d=07&e=1&f=1932&g=
m (last visited June 2, 2012).
48. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1 (2006).
49. Timeline, SECHISTORICAL.ORG, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/timeline/
(last visited June 2, 2011).
50. Mike Brewster, Joseph Kennedy’s Enduring Example, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, May 29, 2003, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2003/
nf20030529_7026.htm.
51. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
52. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., pg. 15 (1934).
53. § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2006).
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Over-the-Counter Regulation

In 1934, NYSE President Richard Whitney presciently warned that the
1934 Act was “rigid and inflexible” in its regulation of the U.S.
exchanges.54 He predicted that the 1934 Act would deflate securities prices
and hinder economic recovery.55 The 1934 Act’s regulation of the
exchanges was comprehensive, and included requirements for minimum
capitalization, outstanding shares, and minimum stock prices.56 To escape
the regulatory spotlight, many securities issuances simply avoided the
listing standards of the exchanges and traded over-the-counter (“OTC”)
instead.57 The OTC markets were left largely unregulated by the 1934 Act.
OTC issuances did not have the disclosure requirements placed on
exchange-traded securities.58 By 1938, it was obvious that OTC trading,
which encompasses “all transactions in securities which take place
otherwise than upon a national securities exchange,” blossomed in the
absence of regulation.59
In congressional testimony in 1938, SEC Commissioner and former
Wisconsin securities regulator George C. Mathews highlighted the dangers
of unsupervised OTC trading. He vividly described the OTC markets as
“unorganized” and unregulated.60 OTC trading was “immense and
varied.”61 In 1938, 6,766 brokerage firms were registered with the SEC as
transacting business in the OTC markets.62 In comparison, there were only
1,375 members of the New York Stock Exchange.63 At the time of
Mathews’ testimony, 6,000 separate issues of stocks and bonds were
admitted to trading on all U.S. stock exchanges.64 In stark contrast, there
were 60,000 total stock issues trading on the OTC markets.65 Indeed,
Mathews estimated that the OTC markets provided the “principal channel

54. Letter from Richard Whitney, President, New York Stock Exchange, to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, U.S. President, (Apr. 12, 1934) available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.
rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1930/1934_04_12_Whitney_to_FDR.pdf.
55. Id.
56. §§ 12, 13, 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012).
57. Regulation of Over-the-Counter Markets: Hearings before the S. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, on S. 3255, 75th Cong., at 14 (1938).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 12 (statement of George C. Mathews, Commissioner, Securities and
Exchange Commission).
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 12.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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for the flow of the savings of our people into new financing.”66 Further,
Mathews opined that direct governmental control of OTC trading was
impractical and prohibitively expensive. He believed that governmental
control would be complex, like “trying to build a structure out of dry
sand.”67
In light of these observations, Congress passed the Maloney Act in
1938.68 With this amendment to the 1934 Act, Congress sought to
“encourage over-the-counter dealers to organize and regulate their
activities under governmental supervision.”69 The premise behind the
amendment was that “[a] group which participates in the promulgation of a
rule . . . will obey that rule better than if it did not share in its enactment.”70
Congress wanted to create a variety of organizations in which brokers and
dealers could register to promote voluntary compliance with ethical
standards. Indeed, under the Maloney Act, “more than one association of
broker dealers could apply for recognition, yet only one did—the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”).71
G. Ushering in the Modern Era
In 1975, the 1933 and 1934 Acts were amended to give the SEC the
power to initiate and approve SRO rule making. The amendment expanded
the SEC’s role in SRO enforcement, oversight, and discipline, which
allowed the SEC to play an active role in structuring the public securities
markets.72
Initially, the exchanges were non-profit organizations. In 2005, by
virtue of its merger with Archipelago Holdings Inc., an electronic
communications network,73 the NYSE became a public company.74 As a
result, the public could own shares in the stock exchange, and the exchange
was answerable to its shareholders.75 As a public company, the NYSE was
66. Id. at 13.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Over-the-Counter Market Act, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3).
69. Tamar Hed-Hofmann, The Maloney Act Experiment, 6 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
187 (1965).
70. Id. at 210.
71. Id. at 187.
72. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
73. Yesenia Cervantes, Note, “Fin Rah!” . . . A Welcome Change: Why the Merger
Was Necessary to Preserve U.S. Market Integrity, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP & FIN. L. 829, 836
(2008).
74. Id.
75. Id. The NYSE merged with Euronext in 2007, which runs exchanges in Paris,
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focused on making a profit, which begs the modern question: can the
exchanges effectively self-regulate if their ultimate goal is to generate their
own profit?
In 2007, the NASD merged with the regulatory arm of the NYSE to
create FINRA. The two organizations announced that they wanted to form
a “private sector regulator for all securities brokers and dealers doing
business with the public in the United States.”76 Advocates asserted that
the merger would ultimately decrease compliance costs, a savings which
could be passed along to customers.77 Critics alleged that the merger would
make enforcement a lower priority.78
Today, FINRA oversees nearly 4,900 brokerage firms, 167,000 branch
offices, and approximately 660,000 registered securities representatives.79
FINRA has approximately 3,000 employees, with headquarters in
Washington, D.C. and New York, and twenty regional offices.80
The American regulatory system has placed significant faith in the
concept of self-regulation in recent decades. However, the current system
has come under criticism for failing to prevent many of the major securities
scandals since the 1980s.81 Most recently, the Bernard Madoff scheme
went undetected for more than a decade. Will self-regulation be effective
in the American retail securities markets in the future, particularly in
enforcement activities?

Amsterdam, Brussels and Portugal making the NYSE. Cervantes, supra note 73, at 843.
76. Press Release, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, NASD and NYSE Group
Announce Plan to Consolidate Regulation of Securities Firms (Nov. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2006/P017973.
77. Carrie Johnson, SEC Approves One Watchdog For Brokers Big and Small, WASH.
POST, July 27, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/27/
AR2007072700108.html
78. Id.
79. FINRA Statistics, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/index.
htm (last viewed Aug. 28, 2011).
80. Id. Since 2008, Britain and the rest of Europe have been moving towards more
governmentally controlled regulators, because the modern weaknesses of the financial
services industry have been exposed and the global recession has occurred. See Michel
Banier, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, The Date of 1st January
Marks a Turning Point for the European Financial Sector, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jan. 1,
2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/barnier/headlines/speeches/2011/01/
20110101_en.htm (announcing the development of three European Supervisory
Authorities—in banking, markets, and insurance and pensions—that will cooperate with the
European Systemic Risk Board).
81. Letter from Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on Government Oversight,
to Congress (Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/letters/financialoversight/er-fra-20100223-2.html.
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II.

CURRENT CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES IN AMERICAN SECURITIES
REGULATION

A.

The Underlying Problem with Self-Regulation

Self-regulation has always presented the proverbial problem of the
“fox guarding the henhouse.” In the bright light of day, the fox dutifully
guards his post. His watchful eyes are ready; his ears piqued to hear even
the slightest whisper of a sound. Inevitably, the sun fades and the shadowy
hand of night sweeps across the horizon. The fox abandons his post and
slips surreptitiously inside the henhouse. He has no apprehension, no
reason to look over his shoulder. He answers to no one. He makes his own
rules. He is his own regulator, motivator, and enforcer. Such is the
dilemma faced by any group governed by the pure principle of selfregulation.
B.

Structural Issues with SROs

In addition to inherent theoretical problems with self-regulation, the
structural framework of the SRO model itself raises questions of whether it
can lead to effective regulation. As the Boston Consulting Group pointed
out in its study mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, “[t]he most fundamental
critique is that self-regulation is not real regulation at all: at best, selfregulation is less effective than government regulation, and at worst, is
merely ‘an illusion’ meant to deflect calls for government oversight.”82
The following section addresses the shortcomings of the current SRO
structure as it applies to the overall regulatory landscape. While we
highlight FINRA for specific examples, in most instances these
shortcomings apply to all SROs.
1. The State Actor Issue
One controversial issue concerning American SROs and their role in
the regulatory community is the “state actor” or “governmental actor”
question. Essentially, is the SRO acting as the government, or is it acting
as a private “membership” entity? The U.S. Constitution protects a wide
variety of individual freedoms. These protections, however, only apply to
governmental conduct. Whether an SRO is deemed to be a state or
governmental actor has significant implications for its ability to investigate
82. BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 25 (2011) [hereinafter BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/967study.pdf.
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and discipline its members, as well as for its ability to share information
with other regulators and law enforcement officials. For example, in recent
years FINRA has been reluctant to share investigative material in ongoing
investigations with state regulators, claiming that such sharing could make
FINRA a “government actor.”83
The state actor issue is best highlighted in the context of FINRA Rule
8210, which requires members and persons associated with members to
provide information and testimony with respect to an investigation,
complaint, or proceeding authorized by FINRA.84 FINRA may sanction
members for failure to provide information and testimony requested under
Rule 8210.85 The Rule provides a means for FINRA to carry out its
regulatory functions in the absence of subpoena power and is a “key
element in [FINRA’s] effort to police its members.”86
Rule 8210(b) further provides that FINRA may share investigative
material with other federal agencies and regulators.87 What happens, then,
when a FINRA member, who is or may be the subject of a criminal
proceeding, is requested to give testimony or provide documents under
Rule 8210? Can the FINRA member invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege, which provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself?”88 If FINRA is not a “state
actor,” the Fifth Amendment privilege is unavailable and the FINRA
member risks sanctions, including suspension or revocation of his
registration, for refusing to cooperate.
In general, the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to
questioning in proceedings before SROs such as FINRA, because the
regulatory activities of such entities do not rise to the level of “state
action.”89 Conduct by FINRA and other SROs may be treated as “state
action” if it is found to be “fairly attributable” to the government.90 When
considering cases under the state actor doctrine, courts generally require
one of three circumstances: (1) the exercise of coercive power or
significant encouragement by the government of the activity in question;
83. Finra Oversight Could Cost Investors, FA-MAG.COM (June 28, 2011),
http://www.fa-mag.com/fa-news/7790-finra-oversight-could-cost-investors.html.
84. FINRA R. 8210 (FINRA 2010), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=13244&element_
id=3883&highlight=8210#13244.
85. Id.
86. Application of Richard J. Rouse, Exchange Act Release No. 32658, 1993 WL
276149 (July 19, 1993).
87. FINRA R. 8210 (FINRA 2008), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=13244&element_id=3883&highlight=8210#13244.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89. United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1975).
90. Id.
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(2) performance of a traditional governmental function by a private entity;
or (3) a “symbiotic” interdependence between the government and the
private entity.91
Courts addressing the specific issue of the Fifth Amendment privilege,
however, have consistently found that the mere sharing of investigative
information without indicia of entwinement by the SEC or another
governmental agency is not sufficient to establish a state action.92 The
Solomon and D.L. Cromwell93 cases illustrate this position. In Solomon, the
NYSE took testimony from a trader under threat of suspension or
expulsion, and then forwarded the deposition transcript to the SEC pursuant
to a subpoena.94 In Cromwell, the NASD and federal prosecutors
simultaneously investigated plaintiff stockbrokers, who in turn sought to
enjoin the NASD from compelling on-the-record interviews. Citing the
Fifth Amendment privilege, the plaintiffs claimed that the NASD inquiry
was merely a tool for prosecutors, pointing out that the NASD interview
demands followed shortly after plaintiffs contested grand jury subpoenas.95
In both cases, the courts held that there was no “state action,” because
the SROs had independent regulatory interests and motives for conducting
their respective inquiries. In Cromwell, the NASD had a preexisting
“regulatory duty to investigate questionable securities transactions.”96 In
Solomon, the court found that the NYSE activities were “in pursuance of its
own interests and obligations, not as [an] agent of the [government].”97 In
other words, in both cases the SRO would have been conducting
investigations anyway, regardless of the governmental interest.
Nevertheless, the SEC has recently acknowledged that under some
circumstances an SRO may be acting as an agent for the government in
conducting the investigation. For example, in Frank P. Quattrone,98 a
person asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to a request for
testimony by the NASD under Rule 8210 because of a related pending
criminal indictment against him. Quattrone sought to present evidence that
91. Application of Justin F. Ficken, Exchange Act Release No. 54699, 2006 WL
3147424, at *3–5 (Nov. 3, 2006).
92. See Frank P. Quattrone, Exchange Act Release No. 53547, 2006 SEC LEXIS 703,
at *22 (Mar. 24, 2006) (noting that applicable law requires a “requisite degree of
coordination,” but that collaboration alone generally cannot constitute state action).
93. D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2002).
94. Solomon, 509 F.2d at 864–65.
95. Cromwell, 279 F.3d at 156–57.
96. Id. at 163.
97. See Solomon, 509 F.2d at 869 (basing its holding on the additional fact that a
contrary holding would create a power in the SRO to grant “use immunity” without the
supervision of the Attorney General to which governmental agencies are subjected).
98. Frank P. Quattrone, Exchange Act Release No. 53547, 2006 SEC LEXIS 703 (Mar.
24, 2006).
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the NASD request related to a joint investigation by the SEC, FINRA, and
the NYSE into research analysts’ conflicts of interest, and that those
entities decided that the NASD would lead the investigation.99 The hearing
panel precluded Quattrone from presenting such evidence.100 The SEC
reversed and remanded the administrative decision, holding that Quattrone
had the right to present evidence that the NASD’s role in the joint
investigation rendered it a “state actor.”101
It should be noted that, although courts and the SEC have generally
treated FINRA as a private non-governmental body in cases addressing the
Fifth Amendment privilege, cases involving the immunity of FINRA from
lawsuits generally uphold that immunity based on the view that FINRA
“should be entitled to the same immunity enjoyed by the SEC when it is
performing functions delegated to it under the SEC’s broad oversight
authority.”102 While these stances appear to be irreconcilable, they do
represent a level of deference given to SROs in performing their regulatory
responsibilities. From a purely practical perspective, sovereign immunity
is as necessary for an SRO to satisfy its regulatory responsibilities as is the
ability to compel cooperation in investigations. The fact that the legal
support for these important “necessities” has generated diametrically
opposed decisions appears to be beside the point.
While FINRA’s capacity to compel its members to cooperate with
investigations without triggering the “state actor” doctrine is undoubtedly
important, FINRA’s interpretation of its limitations under the “state actor”
doctrine is problematic. Under current FINRA policy, FINRA will not
conduct “joint” examinations or investigations with state securities
regulators, nor will it provide state securities regulators access to open
FINRA investigations. Because FINRA and the states have overlapping
jurisdiction and responsibilities, the sharing of information is vital to
regulatory cost, conservation, and effectiveness.103

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
Scher v. Nat'l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc. (NASD),, 218 Fed. App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that NASD actions were actions within the scope of regulatory authority and were
correspondingly entitled to immunity); Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.
1996) (concluding that NASD had absolute immunity from liability arising out of
administration of its disciplinary function).
103. State securities laws uniformly provide for the sharing of investigative material
with other regulators, governmental agencies, and SROs. See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §
608 (amended 2002) (requiring cooperation, coordination, consultation, and record sharing
among agencies); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 415 (amended 1956).
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2. Lack of Transparency and Accountability
One of the pillars of a democratic society is public access to the
workings of government. Federal and state legislative sessions and
hearings are generally open to the public. Moreover, members of the
public can walk into any court in the country and watch the proceedings.
The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the state counterparts
allow for public inspection of governmental documents.104
SROs, however, are not the government. Their decisions are not made
in public meetings, nor are their documents subject to FOIA or other
similar public records requirements. Even where there is public disclosure
by an SRO regarding its members, such as information available on
BrokerCheck, the SRO has placed limitations on such disclosure105 In the
end, members of the public receive less information than they would if a
government agency were involved, and may not be able to obtain the
information they need to make informed decisions. Likewise, SROs lack
the accountability to the public that governmental agencies have.
Ironically, administrative agencies have been criticized in the past for
lacking accountability. Congress has the power to enact laws and is
directly answerable to the public through the ballot box; yet, administrative
agencies, which have the authority to promulgate rules and regulations that
have the force and effect of law, are not. Courts generally have found that
administrative law is implied by Article I of the U.S. Constitution, so long
as agencies are created by Congress and act consistent with enabling
legislation it passes.106
In this light, SROs are further removed than governmental agencies.
FINRA, for example, is accountable to the SEC, which has oversight
authority over it, and to its own members. FINRA need not, however, be
responsive to the investing public. This lack of accountability prompted
the Boston Consulting Group to call for the enhancement of SEC oversight
of FINRA.107

104. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (original version at 80 Stat.
378, 383 (1966)); Right-to-Know Law, 65 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 65.101–67.3104 (2012).
105. BrokerCheck is an online tool that provides information concerning current and
former FINRA-registered brokerage firms and brokers, and is found at
http://www.finra.org/investors/toolscalculators/brokercheck/.
106. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-04, 551–59, (2006)
(explaining generally the validity of administrative law created by valid Congressional
agencies).
107. BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 82, at 135.

IRWIN_FINAL_6327825.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1072

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

7/19/2012 1:23 PM

[Vol. 14:4

3. Inconsistent Enforcement Authority
The recent case of John J. Fiero and Fiero Brothers, Inc. v. FINRA
highlights the fact that the enforcement authority granted to SROs by
Congress under the 1934 Act does not necessarily mirror the enforcement
authority granted to the SEC itself.108 In Fiero Brothers, the Second Circuit
held that FINRA lacks the authority to bring court actions to collect
disciplinary fines. In that case, the Fiero Brothers were expelled from
FINRA and fined $1,000,000 plus costs. After the Fieros refused to pay
the fine, FINRA brought an action in federal court to enforce the judgment.
The court of appeals found that even though Congress granted the SRO the
authority in section 15A(b) of the 1934 Act to fine its members for
violations, it did not provide any express statutory authority for an SRO to
bring judicial actions to enforce the collection of those fines.109 In contrast,
Congress granted in section 21(d) of the 1934 Act the express statutory
authority for the SEC to seek judicial enforcement of penalties.110 This
clear absence of enforcement power dilutes FINRA’s deterrent threat.
4. Conflicts of Interest
Like any SRO, FINRA, by its very nature, is plagued by at least the
appearance of inherent conflicts of interest. Any conflict of interest,
however attenuated, invariably raises the question: whose side is the SRO
on?
a. Funding and Executive Compensation
Any review of how SROs are funded in contrast to the government
agency that oversees them inevitably will spotlight flaws in this regulatory
framework. For example, the SEC is funded primarily from the transfer
and registration fees from stock trades.111 Those fees, which in 2010
generated approximately $1,443,000,000, are deposited with the Treasury
in the first instance.112 The SEC must then petition Congress with its
proposed budget for an appropriation, currently at the $1,120,000,000
level, which is significantly less than the SEC requested and the amount of
108. 550 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2006).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2006) (granting authority to courts to issue injunctions and
money penalties in civil actions).
111. Should the SEC be Self-Funded? Kathleen McBride, ADVISORONE,
Aug. 10, 2009, http://disqus.com/forums/advisorone/should_the_sec_be_self_funded_59/
trackback/.
112. Id.
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fees it generated.113 Likewise, employees of the SEC are paid in line with
federal government pay scales.114 The SEC Chairwoman is paid $158,500
per year. 115
In contrast, FINRA is largely funded by the businesses it supervises.116
FINRA’s operating revenue for the 2010 fiscal year was $807,900,000.117
The vast majority of that operating revenue ($796,500,000 out of
$807,900,000) was earned through fees charged to FINRA members and
member firms.118 From the amount of operating revenue, $540,300,000, or
66.9%, was spent on compensation and benefits.119 Eight out of FINRA’s
top ten executives earned in excess of $1,000,000 in 2010 in their posts.120
FINRA’s compensation packages are modeled after executive
compensation plans at financial services and capital markets firms.121 The
NASD Chairman’s earnings rose from $2,100,000 in 2001 to $3,140,826 in
2007.122 In 2010, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of FINRA
made a base salary of $1,000,000 and earned a total of $2,609,354.123
That FINRA’s budget is substantially sourced from the brokers it
regulates, combined with the fact that FINRA executives are paid large
salaries, does raise concern.124 If executives are paid relatively opulent
salaries by the brokers whom they police, the motivation to regulate can
easily be dampened. In today’s post-Sarbanes-Oxley world, where public
113. Id.
114. 2011 Salary Tables and Related Information, U.S. OFFICE OF
PERS. MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/oca/11tables/index.asp (last visited June 2, 2012).
115. Before the Financial Services Authority was set to be disbanded, it was criticized in
the British press for how it compensated its own staff. In 2008, the Telegraph reported that
“[the FSA] employs 2,740 staff, who last year were paid on average £77,000 in salaries,
training and pensions. The six directors were paid an average of £490,000.” These figures
were then compared by the former FSA Chairman, Lord Turner, as “far lower than his
fellow regulators received in America.” Harry Wallap & David Litterick, FSA Chief Lord
Turner Under Fire as He Calls for Regulator to Be Given More Money, THE TELEGRAPH,
Oct. 17, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3217798/FSA-chief-LordTurner-under-fire-as-he-calls-for-regulator-to-be-given-more-money.html.
116. 2010 FINRA YEAR IN REV. & ANN. FIN. REP. 8, http://www.finra.org/web/groups
/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p123836.pdf.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 18.
121. Id.
122. Rosie Levan, SEC’s New Chairman: Who is Mary Schapiro?, THE SUNDAY TIMES,
Dec.
18,
2008,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_
sectors/banking_and_finance/article5364844.ece.
123. 2010 FINRA YEAR IN REV. & ANN. FIN. REP. 18.
124. The FSA was funded by the banks and financial institutions themselves, who are
levied an annual fee. In 2007, its budget was reported to have totaled £303 million. See
Wallap & Litterick, supra note 115.
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companies are being held to higher standards of independence at the board
of director level, the compensation structure at FINRA at least has the
appearance of potential impropriety. Does a pattern of plentiful executive
compensation incentivize effective regulation when FINRA’s budget is
paid by the industry it is intended to regulate?
Lynn Turner, former chief accountant for the SEC, believes that the
FINRA compensation practices cannot promote investor protection.125
According to Turner, “[t]he economic incentives are so strong and these
executives don’t want to make waves and upset the industry.”126 Richard
Ketchum, FINRA Chairman and CEO, counters this argument by stating
that high executive compensation helps to prevent turnover and encourages
people to “make a career out of regulation.”127
Finally, it should be noted that FINRA makes investments in the
securities markets, which also gives rise to potential conflicts of interest.
For example, in its 2008 annual report, FINRA described the collapse of
the auction rate securities (ARS) market.128 However, it failed to mention
that it liquidated its own $647,000,000 ARS investment in 2007, without
giving warning to investors.129 Regardless whether such warnings were
warranted at the time, the mere fact that FINRA had substantial amounts
invested in securities which have since been the subject of fraud
investigations points to a potential conflict of interest that would not have
been triggered if a government regulator were involved.
b.

Selection Process for FINRA Executives

FINRA often solicits executives from financial services and capital
markets companies it regulates. FINRA states that such industry players
are “the most likely group for recruiting talent as well as those that recruit
talent away from [FINRA].”130 Some would argue that this close
relationship blurs the line between FINRA and the industry, weakening the
drive for aggressive regulation. The Project on Government Oversight, for

125. Alexis Leondis & Zeke Faux, Investors May Lose as Congress Saves Money on
Adviser Oversight, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 28 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2011-06-28/investors-may-lose-as-congress-saves-money-on-adviser-oversight.html.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 2008 FINRA YEAR IN REV. & ANN. FIN. REP. 2, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p119061.pdf.
129. Letter from Larry Doyle, Author, Sense on Cents Blog, to the Board of FINRA
(Jul. 27 2009), available at http://www.senseoncents.com/2009/07/an-open-letter-to-theboard-of-finra-regarding-auction-rate-securities/.
130. FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT 17 (2010).
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example, describes the relationship as “incestuous.”131
Just how close is the relationship between FINRA and the industry?
A recent court filing describes a web of conflicts. In a complaint filed in
August 2009, Amerivet Securities, Inc., a FINRA member-firm, accused
FINRA of egregious conflicts of interest. Specifically, the complaint
alleges:
Bernard Madoff joined NASD’s Board of Governors in January
1984 and served as Vice Chairman while his Ponzi scheme was
well underway;132
He had previously held a number of NASD committee
assignments since the 1970s and was instrumental in the
development of the NASDAQ;133
He also headed NASDAQ;134 His brother, Peter Madoff, served
as Vice Chairman of NASD;135
Mark Madoff, one of Bernard Madoff’s sons, was appointed to
the National Adjudicatory Council, a regulatory body that
reviews disciplinary decisions made by FINRA;136 and
Bernard Madoff’s niece, Shana Madoff, a “Compliance Officer”
of Madoff until the firm’s collapse, was a member of a
compliance advisory committee of FINRA.137
The Board of Governors is FINRA’s “governing body,” and consists
of 16 to 25 members.138 Governors are nominated by a Nominating
Committee, comprised of a portion of the Board. Governors are then
selected by FINRA’s membership at an annual meeting. In turn, FINRA’s
officers are elected by its Board of Governors.139
FINRA’s bylaws state that “the number of Public Governors shall
exceed the number of Industry Governors.”140 The bylaws define a “public
governor” as an individual having “no material business relationship with a
broker or dealer or a self[-]regulatory organization registered under the Act
(other than serving as a public director of such a self[-]regulatory
131. Brian, supra note 81.
132. Complaint at ¶ 27 n.4, Amerivet Secs., Inc. v. Fin.
2009 CA 005767 B (D.C. Sup. Ct. Aug. 10, 2009).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. FINRA BYLAWS, ARTICLE VII, § 1(A), available at
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4629.
139. FINRA BYLAWS, ART. VIII, § 1, available at
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4645.
140. FINRA BYLAWS, Art. VII, § 4(1), available at
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4632.

Indus. Regulatory Auth., No.

http://finra.complinet.com/en/
http://finra.complinet.com/en/
http://finra.complinet.com/en/
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organization).”141
The process for selecting FINRA’s executive leadership is largely
controlled by industry players. FINRA’s membership consists of brokers
and brokerage firms.142 These members elect the Board. The Board then
selects the executive officers. FINRA has attempted to prevent conflicts of
interest by stating that the Board must consist of a majority of public
governors.143
Notwithstanding these attempted safeguards, FINRA’s leadership
maintains a close relationship with the financial services industry. For
example, before joining FINRA, its CEO was a senior manager at
Citigroup Inc., serving as general counsel and sitting on several
committees.144 On one hand, industry professionals may have firsthand
perspectives on how to improve regulation. However, industry insiders
may also instinctively proceed with a light touch when regulating their
former peers.
c.

FINRA Arbitration Process and Awards

Almost every brokerage firm includes in its customer agreements a
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provision. If a case is not settled, the
only alternative is arbitration, and the only arbitration forum available to
investors is the one administered by FINRA. Although arbitration has been
presented to the public as an inexpensive method of obtaining a speedy and
fair resolution of the controversy, statistics do not support such claims.
A review of FINRA arbitration and mediation statistics tells us that
only a fraction of the damages suffered are awarded to claimants.145 In
2010, the median amount sought in compensatory damages through FINRA
arbitration was $310,000.146 The median amount awarded was $129,800.147
Only forty-seven percent of claimants were awarded any amount of
damages at all in an arbitration hearing.148 Additionally, claimants must
141. FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY AUTH., ARTICLE I DEFINITIONS http://finra.complinet.
com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4599 (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
142. About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA.ORG http://www.finra.
org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited June 2, 2012).
143. FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY AUTH.,, ARTICLE VII BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4599.
144. Richard
G.
Ketchum,
FINRA.ORG,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/Leadership/p019335 (last visited
June 2, 2012).
145. Leondis & Faux, supra note 126.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/arbitrationand
mediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ (last visited June 2,
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pay significant filing fees in order to initiate the FINRA arbitration
process.149 In 2011, arbitration claims involving a hearing took an average
of fourteen months to conclude, hardly indicative of a “speedy” resolution
of cases.150
The investing public may well ask, if the system were truly fair, why
is arbitration universally demanded by brokerage firms? It is not surprising
that the investing public does not have confidence in the arbitration system
for a fair resolution of claims.151 One reason for the low “success” rate for
investors in arbitration is the FINRA rule that, until recently, an “industry”
arbitrator was mandated on a panel of three in claims where the amount in
controversy exceeded $100,000.152
The FINRA dispute resolution process is subject to SEC oversight,
including periodic examinations, approval of rule and substantive
procedural changes, and review of investor complaints.153 However,
FINRA readily admits that “[a]ll awards [. . .] are final and are not subject
to review or appeal, except under limited circumstances.”154 Also, it is
sometimes difficult for certain regional offices to retain highly qualified
arbitrators though FINRA Dispute Resolution (DR) “constantly reviews the
quality of the arbitration roster through . . . reviews conducted by the
regional offices.”155

2012).
149. Glenn Curtis, When a Dispute with your Broker Calls for Arbitration,
INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/arbitration.asp#
axzz1SyTOs2Wa.
150. Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA.ORG (last visited June 2,
2012), available at http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/.
151. For example, a recent study commissioned by the Securities Industry Conference
on Arbitration found that sixty-two percent of customers in arbitration felt the process was
unfair. Jill I. Gross, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study,
Feb. 6, 2008, available at http://www.publicjustice.net/Repository/Files/Perceptions
%20of%20Fairness.pdf.
152. To FINRA’s credit, a recent rule allows claimants in arbitration the choice to have
three “public” arbitrators in such cases. See FINRA R. 12403(a), (b), and (d) (FINRA
2010), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&
element_id=4141 (providing customers in cases with three arbitrators to choose between
two selection methods).
153. SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE PANEL ON SECURITIES
ARBITRATION—MAY 17, 2010 FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY STATEMENT
ON KEY ISSUES (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/invadvcomm/iacmeeting
051710-finra.pdf.
154. Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/
(last visited June 2, 2012).
155. Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/
FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/FAQ/P123925. (last visited June 2, 2012)
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Duplicative Roles for Multiple Regulators

For as many gaps that exist in the current regulatory system, under a
certain light, the system can also be considered duplicative in certain areas.
State regulators, the SEC, and FINRA often undertake similar tasks,
investigate the same information, and compete for the same resources.
For example, NASAA describes the role of state securities regulators
as:
LICENSING stockbrokers, investment adviser firms (those
managing less than $25 million in assets),156 and securities firms
that conduct business in the state.157
REGISTERING certain securities offered to the states’ investors.158
INVESTIGATING investor complaints and potential cases of
investment fraud.159
ENFORCING state securities laws by fining, penalizing, providing
restitution to investors, prosecuting white-collar criminals, and
imposing legally binding conduct remedies designed to correct
specific problems.160
EXAMINING brokerage and investment adviser firms to ensure
compliance with securities laws and maintenance of accurate
records of client accounts.161
REVIEWING certain offerings that are not exempt from state
law.162
EDUCATING investors about their rights and providing the tools
and knowledge they need to make informed financial
decisions.163
ADVOCATING passage of strong, sensible, and consistent state
securities laws and regulations.164
Similarly, FINRA’s website proclaims that it “touches virtually every
aspect of the securities business.”165 This includes registering and
educating industry participants, examining securities firms, writing rules,
156. This figure has been increased to one hundred million dollars in assets by
section 410 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (2012).
157. The Role of State Securities Regulators, NASAA.ORG, http://www.nasaa.org/aboutus/our-role/.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Our Role, NASAA.ORG, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/our-role/ (last visited June
2, 2012).
164. Id.
165. About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA.ORG http://www.finra
.org/AboutFINRA/P125239 (last visited June 2, 2012).
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enforcing rules, enforcing federal securities laws, educating investors, and
administering a dispute resolution forum.166 These functions are nearly
identical to the functions performed, at the state level, by state regulators.
The SEC is charged with interpreting federal securities laws, issuing
and amending rules, overseeing regulatory organizations, and coordinating
U.S. securities regulation with federal, state, and foreign authorities.167 The
SEC also provides investor education materials.168 Again, these roles are
virtually identical to the functions performed by FINRA and state
regulators.
In a post National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996
(“NSMIA”) universe, state securities regulators have pursued the
perpetrators at the local level who are scheming against “mom and pop”
investors.169 In turn, the SEC was expected to focus on the larger, more
complex fraudulent activities undermining the securities market at a
national level.170 Nevertheless, states have “exposed and addressed the
conflicts of interest among Wall Street stock analysts by requiring changed
behavior.”171 From 2004 until 2009, state securities regulators conducted
nearly 14,000 enforcement actions which led to $8.4 billion ordered
returned to investors.172 Additionally, during this period state regulators
worked to secure convictions for securities laws violators resulting in more
than 6,000 years in prison.173
IV. THE CURRENT DEBATE: AN SRO FOR INVESTMENT
ADVISERS?
Over 11,000 investment advisers are currently registered with the
SEC. As of September 30, 2010, these advisers managed more than thirtyeight trillion dollars for more than fourteen million clients. To date, the
SEC regulates those investment advisers with assets under management
(AUM) of twenty-five million dollars and over, while the state securities
166. About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.
org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited June 2, 2012).
167. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/about
/whatwedo.shtml (last visited June 2, 2012).
168. Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/
investor.shtml (last visited June 2, 2012).
169. Enhanced Investor Protection After the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of David
Massey, President, North American Securities Administrators Association).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id.
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regulators regulate Investment Advisers with AUM up to that threshold.174
This amount was increased to one hundred million dollars under section
410 of the Dodd-Frank Act, effective in 2012.175
In 2010, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro testified to Congress that the
Commission would be able to examine only about nine percent of
registered investment advisers during the 2011 fiscal year. This statistic
has led some to argue that an SRO should be created for investment
advisers.176 FINRA has made it clear that it would like to assume this
mantle. In the first quarter of 2011, FINRA spent $300,000 to lobby
Congress on issues including overtaking investment adviser oversight.177
In September of 2011, the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets
and Government Sponsored Enterprises vetted draft legislation granting the
SEC authority to register one or more SRO’s for the regulation of
investment advisers.178 It is interesting to note that the investment adviser
industry is almost universally opposed to an SRO, particularly if that SRO
is FINRA.179
SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In a perfect world, regulation would be conducted by wholly
independent regulators. Regulators would be accountable to the investing
public; likewise, their actions and decisions would be transparent to the
public. Regulators would not be paid, nor would their leaders be elected by
those they regulate. Those they regulate—be they brokerage firms,
brokers, investment advisers or their representatives—would enjoy the
same constitutional protections afforded to anyone subject to government
investigation or prosecution.
Obviously, we do not live in a perfect world. For valid reasons,
174. Investment Advisers: What You Need to Know Before Choosing One, SEC.GOV,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/invadvisers.htm (last visited June 2, 2012); The Role of
State Securities Regulators, NASAA.ORG, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/our-role/ (last
visited June 2, 2012).
175. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 410, 15 U.S.C. §
80b-3a(a) (2012).
176. Stephen Luparello, FINRA Vice Chairman, Remarks at FSI Advocacy Summit
(Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Speeches/Luparello/P124599.
177. Leondis & Faux, supra note 125.
178. Kristen French & Diana Britton, House Proposes Bill That Would Give SROs
Oversight
of
Investment
Advisers,
REGISTERED
REP,
Sept.
8
2011,
http://registeredrep.com/advisorland/regulatory/house_bill_sro_investment_advisers_0908/.
179. Hearing on Regulation and Oversight of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of David G.
Tittsworth, Executive Director, Investment Adviser Association), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/091311tittsworth.pdf.
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Congress enacted SRO legislation for securities regulation in 1938. Just as
administrative agencies relieve Congress of overseeing complex matters
beyond its expertise, SROs can relieve the SEC of the minutia of
overseeing the membership of financial service providers in an increasingly
complex financial world. In addition, as has been acutely demonstrated in
recent years, it is expensive for the government to fund an agency the size
of the SEC, and in the age of budget cuts and downsizing government, offloading regulation to an SRO, which can be funded directly by its
members, is an enticing alternative.
This debate is currently being played out in the halls of Congress,
where the question is whether there should be SROs to regulate investment
advisers and their representatives. Largely lost in this debate, however, is
the issue of investor protection and relatedly, investor confidence. While
opposed to the expansion of any SRO to the regulation of investment
advisers, should such an expansion occur, we offer the following
suggestions that would help to protect investors and restore their
confidence in the financial markets. These suggestions are applicable to
FINRA, in its current role as SRO for brokerage firms, and to any future
SRO structure for investment advisers.
The “state actor” issue is problematic because it slows down the
regulatory process by inhibiting sharing among regulators and the SRO.
Also problematic is the fact that FINRA members are not afforded due
process protections. FINRA and other SROs should give thought to
abandoning the idea that they are not “governmental actors.” If they have
been delegated regulatory authority by the government and have
rulemaking authority, they are in fact acting as the government, and due
process (as well as the Freedom of Information Act) should apply. Should
FINRA and other SROs choose to continue the role of a “private
membership association,” the current case law on the “state actor” issue
does not warrant cessation of sharing between the SRO and a regulator,
absent coercion or a joint investigation. Any SRO’s sharing policy should
be consistent with the current state of the law.
The funding of any SRO, and particularly the funding of its executive
officers, correlates with the level of public confidence in the SRO. One
possible way to combat the appearance of potential impropriety would be
to change how FINRA is funded. Currently, FINRA charges fees to its
members to garner the majority of its operating revenue. Instead, a portion
of the federal securities regulation budget could be allocated to these
activities. In that case, FINRA regulators would further shield against
perceptions of undue influence. This insulation potentially would foster
more aggressive regulation, which would help FINRA pursue its goal of
effective investor protection. Alternatively, the inherent conflict of interest
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could be better managed if FINRA relinquished disciplinary control over
its membership and turned enforcement matters back to the states, criminal
authorities, and the SEC.
Likewise, the manner in which FINRA’s leadership is elected can
easily lead to the conclusion of “industry capture.” To counter this
inference, several approaches might be considered. First, FINRA could
require a “sit-down period” for any industry professional hoping to join
FINRA’s regulatory leadership. The professional in question would be
required to remove himself from the industry for a period of time before
soliciting a position with FINRA. Additionally, FINRA could require that
a certain percentage of its Board of Governors and executive leadership
consist of consumer advocates and independent directors. Effective
regulation should inspire investor confidence. Consumer advocates should
have a voice in FINRA’s leadership in order to ensure that investor
protection is a constant priority. Again, alternatively, ceding control over
enforcement matters could also serve to better insulate FINRA from
outside criticism of its structure.
FINRA’s arbitration system does not inspire investor confidence.
First, it is compulsory. The Supreme Court has ruled that the arbitration
provision is a binding contract;180 however, FINRA could institute
rulemaking that would prohibit mandatory arbitration provisions.
Customers would then have a choice between arbitration and litigation.
Second, the belief that arbitration is not played on a level field is wellsupported. While we applaud the recent FINRA rule allowing customers to
choose an all “public” panel, we would urge greater transparency in how
arbitrators are classified as “public” or “industry” and how they are
selected for particular cases.181 In the alternative, even if FINRA continues
to maintain control over all of its other areas (such as enforcement) in its
effort to be a full service regulator, to make the arbitration process appear
more independent, FINRA could collaborate with another organization to
manage the arbitration process. Removing the dispute resolution process
from FINRA’s jurisdiction would add to the legitimacy and credibility of
the arbitration process. Additionally, FINRA, in collaboration with the
SEC and state regulators, could create a system for appellate review of
arbitration decisions.
FINRA should be answerable to the appropriate governmental
regulators, not the other way around, as both a legal matter and as a matter
180. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).
181. See FINRA R. 12403(a), (b), and (d) (FINRA 2010), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4141
(providing customers in cases with three arbitrators to choose between two selection
methods).

IRWIN_FINAL_6327825.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

7/19/2012 1:23 PM

SELF-REGULATION OF THE RETAIL SECURITIES MARKETS

1083

of fact. The recent Fiero case highlights the need for greater oversight of
FINRA’s rulemaking.182 Certainly, one cannot lay blame on FINRA if the
SEC does not exercise its oversight authority. At the same time, the SEC
cannot be faulted if it is not afforded the resources to effect such oversight.
Self-regulation of the retail securities markets in the United States, in
conjunction with government led regulation, has brought about many
positive results for investors. FINRA operates the largest investor
education foundation in the United States.183 Since its inception in 2003,
the foundation has approved approximately fifty million dollars in investor
education and protection initiatives through a combination of grants and
targeted projects.184 FINRA hosts conferences, training events, compliance
boot camps, online learning programs, and the FINRA Institute at the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.185
Likewise, as the BCG Study found, SROs may offer a “greater
technical expertise because of their proximity to the industry,” and that
once a regulatory framework is in place, “self-regulators could monitor the
industry more efficiently than government regulators.”186
However, as discussed above, it is time for continued re-evaluation of
our system at the core.187 Although it appears in the short term that FINRA
will continue to garner power and influence in the American retail
securities markets, Congress and American leadership at the federal and
state levels must consider the longer-term implication of allowing SROs to
aggrandize authority and power. It is the retail consumer in the United
States, the middle class investor, and the vast number of ordinary Main
Street Americans that, in substantial part, demand power in the global
economy. If this dynamic is to continue, as well as a paradigm of selfregulation, adding credibility to the self-regulatory system is imperative.
As Michael Smallberg, an investigator with the Project on Government
Oversight, recently put it: “[g]iving more authority to FINRA should come
with additional transparency and accountability” because a “façade of a
really robust examination or investigation process” will provide a “false
182. 660 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011).
183. About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
AboutFINRA (last visited June 2, 2012).
184. Id.
185. Education, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Education (last visited Apr. 7,
2012).
186. BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 82, at 82.
187. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank
Act”), while robustly comprehensive, addresses gaps in regulation of products and gaps in
areas of securities regulation. Our view of the Dodd-Frank Act is that the all-consuming
economic pressures of the recession beginning in 2008 caused Congress and the regulatory
community to focus on those gaps rather than to include a re-examination of the overall
existing structure of the American securities regulatory system.
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sense of confidence for investors.”188
Notwithstanding, the American near-term reliance on expanding a
self-regulation system stands in sharp contrast to what our respected
counterparts in Europe are doing with their financial regulatory systems.
Europe has eschewed self-regulation in favor of more governmentcontrolled regulation across the continent. The European community is not
giving more responsibility and control to the industry that created the
recession of 2008; rather, it is eliminating financial self-regulators (as in
Britain, for instance), and moving to a more government-centric regulatory
system for the financial markets.189 Congress should be hard pressed to
continue on the path of self-regulation when its foreign counterparts are
moving in the opposite direction, given the ostensible interrelatedness of
our economies, highlighted by the effects on the domestic capital markets
of the debt crisis in Europe.
The multi-dimensional American system of regulation is truly one-ofa-kind. As the normative solutions presented in this Article suggest, our
retail securities regulatory structure could stand to significantly improve
efficiency, decrease compliance costs, and elevate cooperation among
regulators in both national and international senses. An open mind to such
improvements, and leadership in seeing them to speedy fruition, would
enhance both investor safety and investor confidence.

188. Finra Oversight Could Cost Investors, supra note 83.
189. In terms of creating a global system for financial regulation to improve world-wide
securities markets and to support capital building enterprises, the United States Chamber
Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century, in its Summer
2011 report entitled, “U.S. Capital Markets Competitiveness: The Unfinished Agenda,” is
concerned about global disharmony in the capital markets space. The authors state:
We still have the same old system—only more of it. We still have an inexplicable structure
with multiple federal, state, and nongovernmental regulators, which often have overlapping
jurisdictions and . . . conflicting regulations on similar activities, products, and services. . . .
[T]here is no clear plan or strategy to address these fundamental problems . . . [and] foreign
regulators have told us they will not follow our lead.
MICHAEL J. RYAN, JR., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS
COMPETITIVENESS:
THE
UNFINISHED
AGENDA
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1107_UnfinishedAgenda_WEB.pdf.
While this Article focuses on improving the American regulatory system for investor
protection, it is interesting to note that the Chamber of Commerce identifies similar issues
for capital formation and global leadership in the financial capital markets.

